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Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that
P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with
some strength x). I outline the basis for a new, nonprobabilistic version of comparativism
inspired by a suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in “Probability and Partial Belief.” I
show how, and to what extent, ‘Ramseyan comparativism’ might be used to weaken
the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions that comparativism tradi-
tionally relies on.
1. Introduction. Beliefs come in degrees, or so it seems. Assuming they
do, one important question concerns the basis of their numerical representa-
tion. It is typical to represent the varying strengths with which propositions
might be believed using percentages, or real values between 0 and 1, or with
intervals thereof. Moreover, it is typical to assume that these numbers en-
code more than merely ordinal information. For instance, it seems that we
can meaningfully talk about intervals of strengths of belief: an agent—let’s
call her a—might believe one proposition much more than she believes an-
other, or shemight believe it just a little more. Likewise for ratios: ifa is 50%
confident that the coin she flips will land heads, then most of us would be
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happy to say that she has half as much confidence in that event than she has
in the coin landing either heads or tails. And, if she is even a little bit rational,
then she will probably be at least twice as confident that it will land heads
on the next toss than that it will land heads consistently on the next several
tosses.
There is, in other words, a widespread prima facie commitment in our
understanding of degrees of belief that they can be measured on a ratio scale
or something much like it. Given this, we will assume for the remainder of
this article that the numbers we use to represent the strengths of our beliefs
can, at least in principle, carry cardinal (read: at least ratio and therefore
also interval) information. Supposing that is correct, it is just the sort of thing
that ought to be explained by any adequate account of what degrees of be-
lief are. We do not get to posit cardinality for free—a’s doxastic states do
not come with little numbers attached to them, and they do not literally
stand in numerical relationships with one another. Rather, they must have
some nonnumerical structure that is in some way similar to and hence rep-
resentable by the real values in the unit interval, in particular such that both
the ordinal and relevant cardinal properties of and relations between those
numbers represent something doxastically meaningful. That much is clear
enough—the hard part consists in saying exactly what that structure is.
So how is it that we manage to get from the purely nonnumerical stuff in
our heads through to numerical representations of our doxastic states that en-
code interesting cardinal information? A few answers to this question have
been suggested. One long-standing tradition seeks to explain where the num-
bers come from and how they get their meaning, by considering how beliefs
interact with preferences (e.g., Ramsey 1931b). Others have tried to extract
numerical representations out of comparative expectations, a special kind of
nonpropositional comparative attitude (e.g., Suppes and Zanotti 1976). Still
other potential approaches have yet to be explored. For instance, if you like
the idea that degrees of belief are really just outright beliefs about objective
probabilities, then you might think that whatever cardinality they possess is
derivative on the cardinal information possessed by those probabilities—
wherever that comes from.
I am inclined to think that each of these possibilities is worth considering
seriously; at least, none of them seem to me either obviously correct or irre-
trievably hopeless. I have argued elsewhere that the connection with prefer-
ences is one promising avenue to explore (Elliott 2019a). But in this article I
want to focus on an entirely different kind of approach: comparativism.
For the sake of concreteness, I will take comparativism to be the view
that the facts about an agent’s degrees of belief supervene on, and indeed
hold in virtue of, the facts about what we will call her confidence compar-
isons. These are purely ordinal comparative doxastic states such as being
more confident that P than that Q, being equally confident that P as that
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Q, or being at least as confident that P as that Q.1 With that as their starting
point, comparativists tend to see degrees of belief and the numerical repre-
sentations thereof as a kind of theoretical tool, a way to represent and reason
about sufficiently coherent systems of comparative confidence. Or to put
that another way: the numbers we use to represent our beliefs ultimately de-
scribe a purely ordinal structure imposed over a set of propositions by our
confidence comparisons, when those comparisons satisfy some minimum
threshold of coherence.
On the face of it, comparativism might seem to struggle with providing
any plausible explanation of the possibility of cardinal information. After
all, individual confidence comparisons contain no more than purely ordinal
information, so how could a system composed of nothing more than such
comparisons possess anything more than that?2 Nevertheless, compara-
tivists have what is by now a standard explanation of how cardinality can
be generated out of nothing more than ordinal confidence comparisons. By
drawing on a well-worn analogy with the measurement of mass, length, and
other extensive quantities, comparativists have managed to set down condi-
tions (or axioms) under which meaningful cardinal information might be
extracted out of a system of confidence comparisons.
That is the current state of play. However, the axioms to which compar-
ativists typically appeal when addressing this kind of challenge are quite
strong indeed. Essentially, they impose a comparative variety of probabilistic
(and hence logical) coherence on the agents’ confidence comparisons. And
this is a key limitation with the view in its most typical contemporary form:
it lacks an adequate account of how ordinary agents—who do not live up to
the very strict standards of probabilistic coherence—might nevertheless have
beliefs that carry genuine cardinal information. Consequently, in this article I
want to explore whether, and how, the standard ‘probabilistic’ axioms might
be weakened, while maintaining the same basic strategy for extracting cardi-
nality out of a system of comparative confidences.
1. It will not matter too much for what I have to say exactly how we define ‘compar-
ativism’, and there of course are many other ways to precisify the general kind of idea
that I am referring to. Most actual comparativists have taken a view that is at least in
the vicinity of what I below characterize as probabilistic comparativism (e.g., de Finetti
1931; Koopman 1940; Savage 1954, chap. 3; Fine 1973, 68ff.; Hawthorne 2016; Ste-
fánsson 2017, 2018); comparativist theories along these lines are also discussed in Krantz
et al. (1971, 200) and Fishburn (1986). In some cases, a comparativist might focus on
quarternary confidence comparisons (e.g., being more confident that P givenQ than that
R given S), rather than on binary comparisons like those I have described here. For the
sake of brevity, I have limited my discussion to the relatively simple views that consider
only binary confidence comparisons. Nevertheless, each of the main points of discussion
in secs. 3 and 4 have fairly straightforward analogues for the typical case of the quar-
ternary comparativist.
2. For a recent complaint along just these lines, see Meacham andWeisberg (2011, 659).
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Letme say that again, for emphasis: the goal here is to explorewhether, and
towhat extent, the usual probabilistic axioms can beweakened. This is a ques-
tion of interest to proponents and opponents of comparativism alike and for
those who might be on the fence. I stress however that my results are formal,
not evaluative. The current article is not intended to be a defense of compar-
ativism. (It would be woefully inadequate if so.) An evaluation of the overall
merits and demerits of the comparativists’ view is well beyond the scope of
this discussion, and I will not try to address the tricky empirical question of
whether and towhat extent the weakened axioms are satisfied or even approx-
imated by ordinary agents. Still less is this an article on what our comparative
confidences should be like, so I will not have anythingmuch to say about how
Ramseyan comparativism relates to arguments for probabilism.
I begin my discussion by reviewing the standard account of how mass
can be measured on a ratio scale and how probabilistic comparativism pos-
its an essentially similar process for the measurement of belief (secs. 2 and
3). Following that, I discuss in a little more detail the motivations for seek-
ing more general axioms under which cardinality can be extracted out of a
system of confidence comparisons (sec. 4). Finally, I show that the axioms
of what I will call probabilistic comparativism can be weakened to a signif-
icant extent, although not without limits. I do this by developing what I call
Ramseyan comparativism (sec. 5). Moreover, I show that the Ramseyan ax-
ioms on confidence comparisons are in one important respect maximally
weak: inasmuch as comparativists want to retain the analogy with the mea-
surement of mass as it is usually understood, the Ramseyan axioms are as
weak as they come.
2. The Measurement of Mass. Let a and b be any two concrete objects
you like, and compare:
ORDINAL. a is more massive than b.
CARDINAL. a is twice as massive as b.
Cardinal obviously contains more information than Ordinal, and that infor-
mation has to come from somewhere. Yet masses do not come with little
numbers attached to them. Whatever it is that explains the extra information
in Cardinal must ultimately be nonnumerical in nature. So how can we get
from the nonnumerical facts on the ground through to numerical masses
that encode interesting cardinal information?
The representational theory of measurement gives us a plausible answer.3
First, note that Cardinal is true (roughly) if and only if (iff ), if you were to
take two disjoint objects each as massive as b (call them b1 and b2, b’s
3. The locus classicus for this theory is Krantz et al. (1971).
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duplicates) and join them together, then the resulting object would be just as
massive as a. Call the operation of joining objects together concatenation;
we assume that no mass is gained or lost in the act of concatenating. Given
this, it is plausible that there is nothing more to the truth of a claim like Car-
dinal than what we have just said—that is, ‘a is twice as massive as b’ just
means something roughly to the effect of ‘a is as massive as the concatena-
tion of two duplicates of b’. By reference, then, to purely ordinal compar-
isons between duplicates and the concatenations thereof, we have been able
to give straightforward nonnumerical meaning to Cardinal.
And we can easily generalize this idea to explain other rational ratio
comparisons. For positive integers n, m, say that a is n/m times as massive
as b whenever there is some object c such that
1. a is as massive as the concatenation of n duplicates of c, and
2. b is as massive as the concatenation of m duplicates of c.
Now let x designate c’s mass in whatever units you like—let’s say slugs
(∼14.6 kg). Intuitively, a must then have a mass of n  x slugs, and b must
have a mass of m  x slugs. Hence, a is n/m times as massive as b. Indeed,
with a little bit more work, we can generalize the idea even further to ex-
plain arbitrary real ratio comparisons. However, for the sake of simplicity
we will stick with rational ratios throughout this discussion.
Hiding in the background is a crucial empirical assumption: that the op-
eration of concatenation behaves as a kind of nonnumerical analogue of ad-
dition. We rely on exactly this assumption to move from, for example, ‘a is
as massive as the concatenation of n duplicates of an object with a mass of x
slugs’ to ‘a has a mass of n  x slugs’—that is, we assume that the mass of a
concatenation is just the sum of the masses of the concatenands. (Imagine if,
instead, concatenation behaved like quaddition: whenever you concatenate
up to 57 duplicates together, things are as usual, but concatenate more and
the result is always as massive as five duplicates. We could have then used
concatenations to define our way up to one object’s being 57 times more
massive than another but no further.)
Fortunately, the analogy between concatenation and addition is quite
close. Where
a ≿m b iff  a is at least as massive as b,
a ∼m b iff  a is exactly as massive as b,
a  b 5  the concatenation of  a and b,
then it is plausible that ≿m is transitive and complete, and ∼m is its symmetric
part. Furthermore,  behaves with respect to ≿m a lot like 1 behaves with
respect to ≥: for all disjoint objects a, b, c,
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1. a  b ≿m b.
2. a  b ∼m b  a.
3. a  (b  c) ∼m (a  b)  c.
4. a ≿m b iff  a  c ≿m b  c.
Now compare these with the following properties of 1 in relation to ≥,
where n and m are nonnegative real numbers:
1. n 1 m ≥ m.
2. n 1 m 5 m 1 n.
3. n 1 (m 1 k) 5 (n 1 m) 1 k.
4. n ≥ m iff, for any k, n 1 k ≥ m 1 k.
Indeed, if we posit a rich enough space of concrete objects and make one
further ‘Archimedean’ assumption (roughly, that no object is infinitely
more massive than any other), then we can say something stronger still:
ifO is the set of ∼m-equivalence classes of concrete objects and R1 the pos-
itive reals, then the relational system hO, ≿m, i has essentially the same
structure as hR1, ≥,1i. Thus, we can assign a number to each object in such
a way that ≿m is represented by ≥, and  is represented by1. And with that
in hand, we can start to define up ratios of masses, numerical differences in
mass, ratios of differences in mass, and so on. In other words, we have all
the basic resources needed to explain how numerical representations of mass
manage to carry all sorts of interesting cardinal information.
The upshot: numerical masses represent a fully nonnumerical system of
ordinal mass comparisons that have an ‘additive’ structure over concatena-
tions. We are justified in treating ratios of masses as meaningful because
there exists an operation on objects that is intuitively and formally like ‘add-
ing’masses together. And we can apply the same basic idea outlined here to
account for the measurement of other (extensive) quantities: a is twice as
long as b iff a is as long as two length duplicates of b laid end to end, a
has twice the volume of b iff a has the same volume as two volume dupli-
cates of b joined together, and an event e1 has twice the duration of e2 iff e1
can be split into two disjoint events with the same duration as e1.
To apply the same idea to the measurement of beliefs, comparativists
have therefore historically sought an operation on the relata of confidence
comparisons (i.e., propositions) that behaves, with respect to those compar-
isons, similarly enough to addition to justify treating it as a nonnumerical an-
alogue thereof. As Krantz et al. put it, the strategy is “to treat the assignment
of [subjective] probabilities as a measurement problem of the same funda-
mental character as the measurement of, e.g., mass or duration” (1971,
200). So let’s see how that plays out in practice.
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3. Probabilistic Comparativism. In this section I provide an overview of
probabilistic comparativism. I begin by laying out some basic notation and
assumptions (sec. 3.1), followed by the mathematical underpinnings of the
view (sec. 3.2). Finally, I define two specific varieties of probabilistic com-
parativism—one ‘precise’ (sec. 3.3) and the other ‘imprecise’ (sec. 3.4).
3.1. Notation and Assumptions. Let a be an arbitrary thinking subject
whose beliefs we are trying to represent. I will assume that the propositions
regarding which a has beliefs can be modeled as subsets of some space of
logically possible worlds, Q. By ‘logically possible’, I mean no more than
that the worlds are closed under a consequence relation at least as strong as
that of classical propositional logic. So, you can assume that Q includes
metaphysically or even epistemically impossible worlds, if that is what
floats your boat—as long as the worlds are classically logically consistent.
(I talk more about this assumption in sec. 4.)
Next, let B ⊆ }(Q) denote that set of propositions regarding which a has
beliefs. Without loss of generality, I assume throughout that B is a Boolean
algebra of sets on Q. So, B contains at least Q and ∅, and it is closed under
relative complements and binary intersections/unions. I also assume through-
out that B is finite. Doing this will simplify much of the ensuing discussion
and formalities.4
I assume that a’s full system of confidence comparisons can be modeled
with a single binary relation ≿ defined over B, where
P ≿Q iff  a believes P at least as much as she believes Q:
I refer to ≿ as a’s confidence ranking. Consequently, where ≻ and ∼ stand
for the comparatives more probable and equally probable, respectively, I
am in effect assuming that
P ∼ Q iff  (P ≿Q) & (Q ≿ P),
P ≻Q iff  (P ≿Q) & :(Q ≿ P):
Nothing about this last assumption should be treated as obvious or trivial.
For example, a might be at least as confident in P as in Q without being
more confident in P than in Q or without being equally confident in P as
4. The finitude of B plays a minor (simplifying) role in relation to theorem 1. We can do
without it if we instead make use of a more complicated version of definition 5. The fi-
niteness assumption also plays a role in the existence proof of theorem 2. Where B is
uncountable, additional ‘continuity’ assumptions can be placed on the comparative con-
fidence relation that will guarantee the existence of the relevant type of representation.
See Evren and Ok (2011) for discussion on these types of conditions.
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in Q. Nevertheless, it will simplify the discussion, and nothing of great im-
portance hangs on it.
Finally, where a function Cr assigns real numbers to the propositions in
B, I will say that Cr almost agrees with ≿ iff, for all P, Q ∈ B,
P ≿Q only if  Cr(P) ≥ Cr(Q),
and we will say that Cr agrees with ≿ just in case
P ≿Q iff  Cr(P) ≥ Cr(Q):
For ease of expression, I treat agreement (but not almost agreement) as
symmetric: ≿ agrees with Cr just in case Cr agrees with ≿.
3.2. Agreeing with Probabilities. Any Cr that agrees with confidence
comparisons ≿ is ipso facto at least an ordinal-scale representation of ≿.
Our task now is to lay out axioms under which such a function can be said
to also carry cardinal information. This is where probabilities come in handy:
DEFINITION 1. Cr : B ↦R is a probability function iff, 8P, Q ∈ B,
1. Cr(Q) 5 1,
2. Cr(P) ≥ 0, and
3. if P \ Q 5 ∅, then Cr(P [ Q) 5 Cr(P) 1 Cr(Q).
It follows immediately from the third criterion that if some probability func-
tion—any probability function—agrees with ≿, then the union of disjoint
sets is to ≿ just as  is to ≿m, or as 1 is to ≥. Great. That is exactly the kind
of thing needed for the analogy with the measurement of mass to hold water.
Moreover, we have known for a long time the exact conditions under
which a confidence ranking will agree with some probability function on
B. The following five axioms are individually necessary and jointly suffi-
cient (see Scott 1964). For all P, Q, R ∈ B,
COMPLETENESS. P ≿Q or Q ≿ P.
PREORDER. (i) P ≿ P, and (ii) if P ≿Q and Q ≿ R, then P ≿ R.
NONTRIVIALITY. Q ≻∅.
NONNEGATIVITY. P ≿∅.





i51 are finite sequences of propositions, and (ki)
n
i51 is a finite sequence
of natural numbers, then if
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1. oni51ki  1Pi(q) 5 o
n
i51ki  1Qi(q) for all q ∈ Q, and
2. Pi ≿Qi, for i 5 1, ... , n 2 1,
then Qn ≿ Pn.
Call the conjunction of the above five axioms the Complete Package.5
Comparativists have frequently suggested that, when ≿ conforms to the
Complete Package, beliefs can be measured on a ratio scale with the union
of disjoint sets playing the role of concatenation (e.g., Fine 1973, 68ff.;
Stefánsson 2017, 2018).
It is possible to say something a little more general than this, though, and
doing so will be useful in demonstrating a general continuity between prob-
abilistic comparativism and the Ramseyan comparativisms that I develop
below. First, note that if Cr is a probability function, then if Cr(P \ Q) 5
0, then Cr(P [ Q) 5 Cr(P) 1 Cr(Q). That is to say: probability functions
are also additive with respect to the union of what we will call pseudo-
disjoint propositions, where P and Q are pseudodisjoint for a just in case
she has no confidence in their intersection. Or, more precisely,
DEFINITION 2. For all P ∈ B, P is
1. minimal iff Q ≿ P for all Q ∈ B,
2. maximal iff P ≿Q for all Q ∈ B,
3. middling iff P is neither minimal nor maximal.
DEFINITION 3. P ⊆ B is a set of pseudodisjoint propositions iff, for any min-
imal Q and any P| ⊆P such that jP|j ≥ 2, \ P| ∼ Q; furthermore, prop-
ositions P1, ... , Pn are pairwise pseudodisjoint iff there is a set of
pseudodisjoint propositions P such that P1, ... , Pn ∈ P.
Assuming that a has exactly zero confidence in P whenever P is minimal,
definition 3 plausibly characterizes in comparativist terms what it is for a to
believe that at most one proposition from P1, ... , Pn is true.
6
With all that in hand, we can note that the Complete Package implies that ≿
is ‘Archimedean’ (roughly, no proposition is infinitely more probable than
5. In the context of the other axioms, Preorder is redundant, and Scott’s Axiom is equiv-
alent to the slightly weaker formulation found in Scott (1964). See Harrison-Trainor
et al. (2016). I have done it this way to make later discussions easier.
6. Definition 3 implies that every singleton set fPg ∈ B is trivially a ‘set of pseudo-
disjoint propositions’. This is a feature, not a bug. The rather tortured definition will
be useful later when we generalize away from probability functions.
‘RAMSEYFYING’ PROBABILISTIC COMPARATIVISM 735
any other), and furthermore, where propositions P, Q, R are pairwise
pseudodisjoint,
1. (P [ Q) ≿Q.
2. (P [ Q) ∼ (Q [ P).
3. (P [ (Q [ R)) ∼ ((P [ Q) [ R).
4. P ≿Q iff (P [ R) ≿ (Q [ R).
Again, this is exactly what comparativists need to draw the analogy with the
measurement of mass. So let’s turn the foregoing mathematical points into a
philosophical theory.
3.3. Precise Probabilistic Comparativism. Assuming that Cr agrees
with a’s confidence ranking, say henceforth that Cr constitutes a fully ade-








I assume that full adequacy is worth striving for—after all, most theorists
will be happy to make both of the following kinds of inferences:
1. a believes P to degree x and Q to degree y.
2. x 5 n  y.
∴ a believes P n times as much as she believes Q.
And in the other direction,
1. a believes P n times as much as Q.
2. a believes P to degree y.
∴ a believes Q to degree x 5 n  y.
Only full adequacy licenses inferences in both of these directions, and so I
take it that full adequacy stands as an important desideratum for any com-
parativist theory. With that said, we can also say that Cr is L-to-R adequate
iff the left-to-right direction of the above biconditional holds, and R-to-L
adequate iff the right-to-left direction holds. Comparativists may well want
to reject full adequacy in favor of mere L-to-R or R-to-L adequacy, pro-
vided that the rejection is well motivated and they are able to explain away
any intuitions in support of full adequacy. (I say a little more about this in
sec. 5.3.)
Next, let precise probabilistic comparativism denote any comparativist
theory that is committed to the following conditional:
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PRECISE PROBABILISTIC COMPARATIVISM. If Cr is the unique probability func-
tion that agrees with a’s confidence ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate
model of a’s beliefs.
Note the stated requirement that the probability function be unique. This is
needed to avoid contradiction: for any nontrivial algebra B, there will al-
ways be some collection of probability functions on B that agree with
one and the same confidence ranking—and since any two probability func-
tions on the same domain will disagree on at least some ratios, any infer-
ence from ‘Cr(Q) 5 n=m  Cr(Q)’ to ‘a believes P n/m times as much as
Q’ will be valid only when the Cr is unique in the relevant sense. In short,
R-to-L adequacy presupposes uniqueness, which in turn requires further
constraints on ≿.
There are multiple ways to ensure uniqueness. Of particular note is what
Stefánsson (2017, 2018; cf. also Savage 1954; Suppes 1969, 6–7) uses to
ensure uniqueness in his recent defenses of probabilistic comparativism:
CONTINUITY. For all nonminimal P, Q, there are P 0, Q 0 such that P ∼ P0,
Q ∼ Q0, and P 0 and Q 0 are each the union of some subset of a finite set
of disjoint propositions R1, ... , Rm such that Ri ∼ Rj for i, j 5 1, ... , n.
The interested reader can see Krantz et al. (1971, sec. 5.2) and Fishburn
(1986) for other conditions sufficient to ensure uniqueness.
Now, probabilistic comparativism clearly has resources to put forward an
account of how a system of confidence comparisons might end up carrying
cardinal information, in the event that ≿ satisfies the requisite axioms. In
particular, consider the following principle, which in essence is just the
comparative probability version of how we defined rational ratio compari-
sons for mass earlier in section 2:7
GENERAL RATIO PRINCIPLE. a believes P n/m times as much as Q if
1. for 0 < n ≤ m, there are m nonminimal, equiprobable pairwise
pseudodisjoint propositions R1, ... , Rm such that Q ∼ (R1 [ :::
[ Rm) and P ∼ (R1 [ ::: [ Rn), or
2. a believes P n0/m0 times as much as R and believes R n00/m00 times
as much as Q, where n=m 5 n0  n00=m0  m00.
7. The first clause of the General Ratio Principle is a close relative of Stefánsson’s
(2018) Ratio Principle. The second (inductive) clause is new—in the context of a con-
dition like Continuity it is redundant, but see sec. 4 for it put to work.
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So, for instance, suppose that Q \ Q0 is minimal. Then, a will take P to
be twice as probable as Q inasmuch as Q ∼ Q0 and (Q [ Q0) ∼ P. In this
case, Q and Q0 are acting as ‘duplicates’ of one another, and Q [ Q0 is their
‘concatenation’.
3.4. Imprecise Probabilistic Comparativism. Say that Cr confirms the
General Ratio Principle (GRP) just in case, whenever that principle implies
that P is believed n/m times as much as Q, then Cr(P) 5 n m=  Cr(Q); oth-
erwise, it disconfirms the GRP. It is easy to check that if any probability
function almost agrees with ≿, and ∅ is minimal, then that function will
confirm the GRP. This means that it is possible to extend the account of ra-
tio comparisons just given to incomplete confidence rankings.
For ordinary agents, the Completeness axiom is widely considered
highly implausible. Consider the following statements, adapted from Fish-
burn (1986):
P 5 The global population in 2100 will be greater than 13 billion.
Q5 The next card drawn from this old and incomplete deck will be a heart.
Are you more confident that P than that Q, or less, or just as confident in
either? It is not clear that there must be a fact of the matter. Similar examples
abound.8
There is a natural way of dealing with incompleteness to which com-
parativists can (and do) appeal. Where F is any set of real-valued functions
on B, say this time that the set F agrees with ≿ just in case for all relevant P,
Q,
P ≿Q iff  8 Cr ∈ F : Cr(P) ≥ Cr(Q):
The idea behind a set-of-functions model is to recapture the structure of the
confidence ranking by doing something like supervaluating over the func-
tions in F—only what is common to every such function is treated as hav-
ing representative import. If P and Q are incomparable in terms of relative
confidence, thenFwill contain at least one pair of probability functions that
disagree on the relative ordering of P andQ—hence, we still manage to ‘nu-
merically’ represent incomplete ≿ rankings.
Alon and Lehrer (2014) have shown that a set of probability functions
agrees with ≿ just in case the latter satisfies the Complete Package minus
the Completeness axiom (i.e., the Noncomplete Package). Furthermore,
8. You do not have to be convinced by the example, and here is not the place for a de-
tailed discussion on whether we should expect ‘gaps’ in ≿. What matters is just that there
might be gaps, and many think that there are. Completeness may or may not be plausible
for perfectly rational agents, but since our focus is on deidealizing the usual probabilistic
theory that is neither here nor there.
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while there will often be more than one set of probability functions F that
agrees with ≿, the union of all such sets will always agree with ≿. In sum:
whenever ≿ satisfies the Noncomplete Package, there is guaranteed to be a
unique set of probability functions that agrees with ≿ and that is maximal
with respect to inclusion.
Consequently, if we extend the definitions of full/L-to-R/R-to-L ade-
quacy in the natural way (i.e., by inserting ‘8 Cr ∈ F ’ in the appropriate
locations), we can characterize imprecise probabilistic comparativism by
its commitment to:
IMPRECISE PROBABILISTIC COMPARATIVISM. If a nonempty set of probability
functions F agrees with a’s confidence ranking and F is maximal with re-
spect to inclusion, then F is a fully adequate model of a’s beliefs.
Imprecise probabilistic comparativism implies the precise version. More
precisely, if we assume that F and Cr are essentially the same representation
whenever F 5 fCrg, then the two varieties of comparativism amount to
one and the same thing whenever exactly one probability function agrees
with ≿.
Furthermore, every Cr in a set F that agrees with ≿ will itself almost
agree with ≿. So, if we also extend the definition of ‘confirms the GRP’
in the obvious way to sets of functions, it follows that if a set of probability
functions F agrees with ≿, thenF confirms the GRP. The upshot is that both
the precise and imprecise versions of probabilistic comparativism can ex-
tract cardinality from comparative confidences in basically the same way;
the latter is a natural generalization of the former.
4. Why Generalize? We have seen now that conformity to the Non-
complete Package is sufficient for the union of pseudodisjoint sets to be-
have like addition. But it is by no means necessary. It is possible to weaken
those axioms still further while maintaining the analogy, and I think it is of
some importance for comparativism that this can be done. In this section I
say why.
The basic reason is that the axioms of the Noncomplete Package are, in
conjunction, quite strong—it is not likely that they are jointly satisfied by
any ordinary agents. Since I think it is especially troubling, I will focus on
one issue in particular: in the context of the (individually rather weak) axioms
Nontriviality and Nonnegativity, Scott’s Axiom immediately generates a
probabilistic version of the classical problems of logical omniscience. Those
three axioms entail that if P ⊆Q and P, Q ∈ B, then Q ≿ P. Consequently,
LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE. If the worlds in Q are closed under the consequence
relation ⇒, then for all P, Q ∈ B, if P ⇒ Q, then Q ≿ P.
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That is, any confidence ranking that is (i) defined over propositions taken
from a space of worlds that is closed under ⇒ and (ii) agrees with a (set
of ) probability function(s) will ipso facto be ‘coherent’ with respect to ⇒
in the manner just described. In section 3.1 it was assumed that ⇒ is at least
as strong as the consequence relation we find in classical propositional
logic, and it is implausible that ordinary agents’ confidence rankings are every-
where and always coherent with respect to that logic. I say more about that
in a moment. But the point can also be put in a much more general way: we
are (probably) not omniscient with respect to any very interesting logics, so
unless ⇒ is extremely weak indeed, the confidence rankings of any ordinary
agents will (probably) falsify at least one of Nontriviality, Nonnegativity, or
Scott’s Axiom.
How might a comparativist respond to this fact? Four obvious (but also
obviously nonexhaustive) options are:
1. Argue that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do conform to
the Noncomplete Package after all, because they are probabilistically
coherent after all.
2. Argue that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do conform to
the Noncomplete Package after all, once we define propositions over
a richer space of worlds.
3. Argue that because ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do not
conform to the Noncomplete Package, they therefore do not ground
any cardinal information (or not the same kind of information).
4. Accept that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do not conform
to the Noncomplete Package and seek weaker axioms under which
cardinality can be extracted from comparative confidences.
The fourth seems to me clearly the best option. After all, nothing about
comparativism per se ties it irrevocably to specifically probabilistic repre-
sentations of degrees of belief, and if more general conditions exist then
it only makes sense for comparativists to find and use them. But if you pre-
fer one of the others, or something else not listed, then so be it—there is no
harm in developing ideas in many different directions. I will, however, here
give some reasons to think that the fourth option should be preferred.
Regarding the first: I take it for granted in the following discussion that
we are not (classically) logically omniscient. But maybe we are—sure, and
I am not unsympathetic to the idea that we ordinary agents really are prob-
abilistically coherent. But since this is usually met with an incredulous stare
let’s just move on already.
The second option seems to be the more common way of arguing that the
Noncomplete Package can actually be satisfied by ordinary (and ordinarily
irrational) agents. As I have noted, if the entailment relation ⇒ is weak
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enough, then logical omniscience might not look so bad. Sowhat would hap-
pen if we remove the assumption that the worlds in Q are closed under any
interesting logic?
In a little more detail, the idea is this. If we help ourselves to a rich
enough space of possible and impossible worlds, then it is well known that
we can construct a probability function properly so-called on that enriched
space that ‘mimics’ the behavior of a nonprobabilistic function defined over
the smaller space of classical possible worlds.9 So what looks like compar-
ative confidences that are inconsistent with Nontriviality, Nonnegativity, or
Scott’s Axiom when they are defined for propositions qua sets of possible
worlds can in fact be rerepresented using (sets of ) probability functions, if
we make use of enough impossible worlds. Hence, to apply the probabilis-
tic comparativists’ explanation of cardinality to ordinary agents, we do not
need to weaken the axioms all. We can keep the Noncomplete Package as
long as we just make sure to use enough impossible worlds.
That seems easy enough, but I do not think that this is a viable strategy
for the comparativist to adopt. I will set out the reasons for this very briefly,
since most of the relevant issues are discussed at length in Elliott (2019b).
The problem is that once Q includes enough impossible worlds for the strat-
egy to work (roughly, for any impossibility, there is an impossible world
that verifies it), then most subsets of Q will be meaningless and conse-
quently not representative of any proper contents of belief. Moreover, for any
meaningful subset P of Q, none of P’s subsets or supersets will be meaning-
ful, nor will any subset of Q ∖ P be meaningful. In short, having too many
impossible worlds in Q renders useless for the purposes of comparativism
any set-theoretic definition of ‘concatenation’ along the lines described in
section 3. Furthermore, any algebra of propositions defined on a space of
possible and impossible worlds that is rich enough to represent the contents
of belief will contain only meaningful propositions just when the relevant
space of worlds is closed under a consequence relation that is, for all intents
and purposes, at least as strong as classical propositional logic.
Of course, comparativists do not have to define their concatenations set
theoretically as I have done in section 3.2. But the only other place that
we will plausibly find the structure required to define an appropriate concat-
enation operation is in the logical relations among the contents of the prop-
ositions. That is, we could define concatenations in terms of disjunctions of
inconsistent contents (or disjunctions of contents whose conjunctions are
minimal). But defining the concatenation operation in this way brings us
9. Where Q is the space of classically possible worlds, B ⊆ }(Q), and Cr : B ↦ ½0, 1, then
if Q1 is a rich enough extension of Q into the space of impossible worlds, there is a prob-
ability function Cr1 on an algebra of sets B1 ⊆ }(Q1) such that Cr1 assigns x to the sub-
set of Q1 that verifies J iff Cr assigns x to the subset of Q that verifies J (see Cozic 2006;
Halpern and Pucella 2011; Elliott 2019b).
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straight back to where we started vis-à-vis the problem of logical omni-
science, and appealing to impossible worlds will be of absolutely no help
here.
So there is no easy way to pursue either the first or the second route: if
you want to tie the possibility of cardinality to the Noncomplete Package,
then you will be tying it to very strong conditions of logical omniscience.
And consequently you will need to face up to the empirical and intuitive
evidence that ordinary agents just are not that good at classical logic.
Could we instead take the third route and argue that ordinary agents
whose comparative confidences do not satisfy the Noncomplete Package can-
not have beliefs that carry ratio and interval information? This does not strike
me as very plausible. For example, the literature on the conjunction and dis-
junction fallacies already strongly suggests that ordinary agents do not have
comparative confidences that respect even relatively simple bits of classical
logic. So imagine that a has just committed the conjunction fallacy—she
thinks it is more plausible that Linda is a bank teller (B) and active in the fem-
inist movement (F ) than that she’s a bank teller. Arewe going to say now that
there is no meaningful way to answer the question of how much more a be-
lieves B \ F over B? Of course not. Similarly, I am not logically omniscient,
and (like most people) I have probably fallen foul of various probabilistic fal-
lacies before. My comparative confidences do not satisfy the Noncomplete
Package. Maybe they do not even come close to satisfying those axioms.
None of this prevents me from believing some things much more than other
things, or at least twice as much as other things.
Our capacity to believe one proposition much more than another, or (at
least) twice as much as another thing, and so on, is not hostage to any pre-
supposition of logical coherence; still less should it depend on a condition of
probabilistic representability. Most philosophers will see no inconsistencies
at all in holding both that (a) ordinary agents’ beliefs cannot be faithfully
represented by (a set of ) probability functions and that, (b) for arbitrary P
and Q, an ordinary agent might believe P much more than Q, or (at least)
twice as much asQ. These claims should be uncontroversial—only someone
caught firmly in the grips of a deeply unrealistic picture of belief would think
to deny it. Or at least I will say this: if you want to argue otherwise, then you
will be facing a difficult uphill battle. Better, I think, to seek more general
axioms under which cardinal information can be extracted from a system
of comparative confidences.
5. The Ramseyan Alternatives. What I am calling Ramseyan com-
parativism is inspired by a brief remark from Frank Ramsey in “Probability
and Partial Belief ”: “ ‘Well, I believe it to an extent 2/3’, i.e. (this at least
is the most natural interpretation) ‘I have the same degree of belief in it
as in P ∨Q when I think P, Q, R equally likely and know that exactly
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one of them is true’” (1931a, 95). In a recent paper, Weatherson (2016,
223–24) has also suggested that Ramsey’s remark points toward a version
of comparativism that is weaker than probabilistic comparativism. How-
ever, neither Ramsey nor Weatherson take their discussion beyond this initial
suggestion, and (as we will soon see) there is a bit of work that needs to be
done in order to flesh the idea out in full.
In the remainder of this article, I develop precise Ramseyan compara-
tivism (secs. 5.1 and 5.2) and then an imprecise version (sec. 5.3). Follow-
ing that, I prove an important result about the axioms under which Ramseyan
comparativism supports the analogywith themeasurement ofmass (sec. 5.4).
5.1. The Main Ideas. First, it will be useful to introduce another defi-
nition (the term ‘n-scale’ comes from Koopman [1940]):
DEFINITION 4. A set P of n pseudodisjoint propositions is an n-scale of P iff
(i) P ∉ P, (ii) [ P ∼ P, and (iii) for all Q, Q0 in P, Q ∼ Q0.
We can take this as a comparativist characterization of what it is for an agent
to think that Q is as likely as a disjunction of equiprobable propositions
at most one of which is true. So, for example, if a thinks Q is as likely
as P [ P 0, where P and P 0 are equiprobable and pseudodisjoint, then {P,
P 0} is a 2-scale of Q. We will also assume that a is certain of P’s truth just
in case P is maximal, and we will represent certainty in P with Cr(P) 5 1.
This is something the Ramseyan view shares with probabilistic compara-
tivism, where in order to fix the scales the values of the minimal and max-
imal propositions need to be stipulated.
In light of definition 4, Ramsey’s idea can be recast as follows: a be-
lieves P to degree n/m when P ∼ (Q1 [ ::: [ Qn), where the Q1, ... , Qn be-
long to an m-scale {Q1, ... , Qn, ... , Qm} of some maximal proposition R. A
good start—but there is a natural extension that will be helpful to incorpo-
rate into what follows.
Consider, to begin with, the following situation. Let B designate the
power set of Q 5 fq1, q2, q3g, and let Phni and Phnmi designate the possi-
ble worlds propositions {qn} and {qn, qm}, respectively (e.g., Ph 12 i 5
fq1,q2g). Suppose now that ≿ is transitive and reflexive, and (where the














We can represent ≿ with figure 1, where the relative sizes of the boxes
containing the qi correspond to the order of propositions in the confidence
ranking.
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Now Q is maximal, and {Ph12i, Ph3i} is a 2-scale of Q, so Ramsey would
say that




However, Ph1i and Ph2i do not belong to any n-scale of Q, so Ramsey’s idea
does not yet give us any strength with which they are believed. But since
{Ph1i, Ph2i} is a 2-scale of Ph12i, it is only reasonable to say that




We can capture the foregoing by means of the following definition:
DEFINITION 5. For integers n, m such that m ≥ n ≥ 0, m > 0, P is
1. 0/m valued if P is minimal and m/m valued if P is maximal, and
2. n/m valued if P ∼ (Q1 [ ::: [ Qn0), where the Q1, ... , Qn0 belong
to an m0-scale of an n00=m00-valued proposition, and n0  n00=
m0  m00 5 n=m.
The new, generalized version of Ramsey’s idea now amounts to the claim
that a believes P to degree n/m if P is n/m valued. As such, define a Ramsey
function as follows:
DEFINITION 6. Cr : B ↦ ½0, 1 is a Ramsey function (relative to ≿) iff, for all
P ∈ B, if P is n/m valued, then Cr(P) 5 n=m.
The close connection between Ramsey functions and the GRP should at this
point be apparent, and it should likewise already be clear that the way Ram-
sey proposes to measure degrees of belief is not too different from the strat-
egy the probabilistic comparativists want to adopt. In fact, in the present ter-
minology, the first (noninductive) clause of the GRP essentially states that
Figure 1. Indirect R-Scalability.
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for m ≥ n, P is believed n/m times as much as Q whenever P is an m-scale
ofQ, and P 0 ⊆P is an n-scale of P. In this case, for any Ramsey function Cr,
Cr(P) 5 n=m  Cr(Q). With respect to n/m-valued propositions, Ramsey func-
tions always confirm the GRP.
Essentially, a Ramsey function either directly or indirectly scales every
middling n/m-valued proposition relative to some maximal proposition,
which has a stipulated value.With respect to pairs of propositions that cannot
be so scaled, however, a Ramsey function may disconfirm the GRP. An es-
pecially clear example where this would occur can be seen in figure 2.Where








≻ Ph 1 i ≻∅:
In this case, the only nontrivial n-scale is the 2-scale {Ph2i, Ph3i} of Ph23i. Ac-
cording to the GRP, then, we should be able to say
Cr(Ph 2 i) 5 Cr(Ph 3 i) 5
1
2
 Cr(Ph 23 i):
However, since Ph23i cannot be scaled relative to Q, Ramsey’s suggestion
gives us no means of fixing values for Ph2i, Ph3i and Ph23i.
Call any proposition that is n/m valued R-scalable. All of the proposi-
tions other than Q and∅ represented in figure 2 are not R-scalable. Ramsey
says nothing about how to measure propositions that are not R-scalable, al-
though perhaps this is not a very troubling gap in his proposal. One might
simply assume that such cases do not exist. Let N designate the set of R-
scalable propositions, then:
R-SCALABILITY. N 5 B.
R-Scalability is not implied by the Complete Package. However, given that
package, it is equivalent to Continuity. (See the appendix for a proof.)10 In
Figure 2. Failure of R-Scalability.
10. The proof rests in part on the assumption that B is closed under unions. Without that
assumption, Continuity will imply R-Scalability but not vice versa.
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other words, precise probabilistic comparativists do not seem to have any-
thing to fear from an axiom like R-Scalability. (Nevertheless, I discuss be-
low how the Ramseyan comparativist can do without it.)
R-Scalability merely guarantees that every proposition in B is R-
scalable. Importantly, this is not yet enough to ground a minimally plausible
comparativist theory. There are still two additional problems that can arise
in the absence of further assumptions about the structure of ≿:
1. We need to ensure that definition 6 is consistent. Without further as-
sumptions, it is possible that, for example, P ∼ Q, where for some R,
P belongs to a 2-scale of R and Q belongs to a 3-scale of R. This is
clearly unacceptable: a cannot believe P to the degrees 1/2 and 1/3
simultaneously. If Ramsey functions are to be well defined, we will
need to ensure that if P is both n/m valued and n0/m0 valued, then
n=m 5 n0=m0.
2. We need to ensure that any Ramsey function relative to ≿ will agree
with ≿. Without further assumptions, there is no guarantee that
Cr(P) ≥ Cr(Q) if or only if P ≿Q. For instance, P could be 1/2 valued
and Q 1/4 valued, yet Q ≿ P. This is also undesirable: if the order of
the values we assign propositions does not match up to the confidence
ranking, then there can be no plausible sense in which those values
are a measure of the strengths with which those propositions are
believed.
In the presence of R-Scalability, we can kill these two birds with a single
stone by adding the following rather strong axiom:
R-COHERENCE. If P is n/m valued and Q is n0/m0 valued, P ≿Q iff
n=m ≥ n0=m0.
R-Coherence is sufficient to avoid both worries, as established by the fol-
lowing representation theorem:
THEOREM 1. (i) ≿ satisfies R-Coherence iff there exists a Ramsey function
Cr with respect to ≿, and (ii) ≿ also satisfies R-Scalability iff Cr is the
unique Ramsey function relative to ≿ that agrees with ≿.
The proofs for this theorem and the two that follow below can be found in
the appendix.
5.2. Precise Ramseyan Comparativism. We will say from now on that
one accepts precise Ramseyan comparativism just in case one accepts the
following conditional:
746 EDWARD ELLIOTT
PRECISE RAMSEYAN COMPARATIVISM. If Cr is the only Ramsey function rel-
ative to a’s confidence ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate model of a’s
beliefs.
We can now characterize precisely the respects in which precise Ramseyan
comparativism is more lenient than probabilistic comparativism. To start
with, it is easy to see that R-Coherence is implied already by the Complete
Package. Indeed, if any probability function Cr agrees with ≿, then Cr is also
a Ramsey function relative to ≿. Moreover, where the Complete Package
plus R-Scalability holds, then the unique probability function that agrees
with ≿ just is the unique Ramsey function that agrees with ≿. This is impor-
tant, since (in light of what we said earlier) it means that precise Ramseyan
comparativism is a generalization of any version of precise probabilistic
comparativism that makes use of Continuity.
In the other direction, R-Scalability and R-Coherence together obviously
imply Completeness and Preorder. However, they do not imply any of Non-
triviality, Nonnegativity, or Scott’s Axiom. For a simple (albeit extreme)
example in which all three of those axioms fail, assume that Q 5 fw1,













































































It is straightforward (albeit a little tedious) to check that R-Scalability and
R-Coherence are satisfied in this case. The only nontrivial n-scales (i.e.,
n > 1) that can be defined using this ranking are:
1. The 2-scale {Ph23i, Ph34i} of the maximal propositions;
2. The 2-scale {Ph123i, Ph14i} of ∅, Q, Ph23i, and Ph34i;
3. The several n-scales composed out of minimal propositions, each of
some other minimal proposition.
Consequently, Cr(Q) 5 Cr(∅) 5 1=2 because {Q} and {∅} are 1-scales of
Ph23i and Ph34i, where the latter are 1/2 valued, and Cr(Ph 2 i) 5 1=4, because
{Ph2i} is a 1-scale of Ph14i and Ph123i, where the latter are 1/4 valued. Every
other proposition is either maximal or minimal and assigned either 1 or 0
accordingly. That the example violates Nontriviality and Nonnegativity is
obvious; to see that it violates Scott’s Axiom it suffices to consider the
two short sequences Ph13i, Ph24i and Ph12i, Ph34i.
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The interesting ‘work’ here is of course being done entirely by R-
Coherence. This axiom imposes a limited kind of additive structure on ≿,
specifically with respect to confidence rankings between propositions con-
structed out of members of the same n-scale of any n0/m0-valued proposition.
Roughly, within an n-scale, ≿ behaves “pseudoprobabilistically”—but not
every proposition is constructible out of the members of an appropriate
n-scale, and across n-scales ≿ can behave quite irrationally indeed.
5.3. Imprecise Ramseyan Comparativism. If we wanted to drop R-
Scalability out of the picture, we could do so by adopting a set-of-functions
representation of ≿. For that, we will need to add back in the Preorder ax-
iom. This is obviously necessary for any real-valued function or set thereof
to agree with ≿, and it is not implied by R-Coherence alone.
THEOREM 2. ≿ satisfies Preorder and R-Coherence iff there is a nonempty
set F of Ramsey functions relative to ≿ such that F agrees with ≿, and in
such cases there will also be a unique such F that agrees with ≿ that is
maximal with respect to inclusion.
Given this, let’s characterize the imprecise variety of Ramseyan compar-
ativism by its commitment to:
IMPRECISE RAMSEYAN COMPARATIVISM. If F is a nonempty set of Ramsey
functions with respect to a’s confidence ranking, which is maximal with
respect to inclusion and agrees with ≿, then F is an R-to-L adequate model
of a’s beliefs.
Note that imprecise Ramseyan comparativism only claims R-to-L ade-
quacy. This is because (as we have seen) Preorder and R-Coherence are
not sufficient for a (set of ) Ramsey function(s) to confirm the GRP in full.
This is a limitation with the imprecise Ramseyan comparativist’s theory, but
perhaps not a devastating one. In effect, R-to-L adequacy says that we will
not go wrong whenever we read cardinal information off of the numbers,
although there may be some interesting cardinal properties to one’s degrees
of belief that are not appropriately captured by their cardinal representation.
Although it is not perfect, I suspect that many comparativists would be sat-
isfied by this result—nobody said that our numerical representations had to
be perfect after all.
Imprecise Ramseyan comparativism also agrees exactly with (precise
and imprecise) probabilistic comparativism whenever the Complete Pack-
age plus R-Scalability are satisfied. We have already shown that this is so
for precise Ramseyan comparativism, but if this is not obvious in the case
of imprecise Ramseyan comparativism then consider this: if we assume the
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Complete Package plus R-Scalability, then the probability function Cr that
agrees with ≿ is the Ramsey function that agrees with ≿; from imprecise
Ramseyan comparativism, Cr is R-to-L adequate, so Cr determines a unique
ratio comparison for every pair of nonminimal propositions; and finally, a
cannot believe P n/m times as much as Q and n0/m0 as much as Q, for
n=m ≠ n0=m0.
5.4. The Importance of R-Coherence. Importantly, we can show that
Preorder and R-Coherence are individually necessary for coherence with
the GRP. As far as Preorder is concerned, this is obvious for the reasons al-
ready mentioned. The more interesting result concerns R-Coherence. Given
some very minimal scaling assumptions, violations of that axiom imply that
any Cr that agrees with ≿ cannot confirm the GRP:
THEOREM 3. If (i) Cr agrees with ≿, (ii) there are P, Q such that P ≻Q, and
(iii) Cr(R) 5 0 whenever R is minimal, then Cr confirms the GRP only if
R-Coherence is satisfied.
Corollary. Under the same assumptions, mutatis mutandis, any set of real-
valued functions F will confirm the GRP only if R-Coherence is satisfied.
In other words, assuming just that ≿ has some nontrivial structure, and that
minimal propositions can be assigned value 0, that a function (or set of
functions) confirms the GRP implies that any comparative ranking it agrees
with will satisfy Preorder and R-Coherence. Thus, we have found two min-
imal axioms necessary for the union of pseudodisjoint sets to behave like
addition with respect to ≿.
6. Conclusion. Let’s take stock. The standard comparativist strategy for
explaining cardinality is based on a purported analogy with the measurement
of certain extensive quantities like length or mass. So, for instance, to say that
P is n timesmore likely thanQ, we just need to be able to say thatP is as likely
as the union of n ‘duplicates’ of Q, where the ‘duplicates’ are propositions
that are equiprobable and pairwise (pseudo)disjoint. The two Ramseyan va-
rieties of comparativism I have outlined offer an account of when this kind of
‘adding’ is meaningful that generalizes the axioms assumed by the more
common probabilistic comparativism, thus applying to a wide range of con-
fidence rankings that are not probabilistically representable.
In particular, we have shown that comparativists can in principle do
without any appeal to Nontriviality, Nonnegativity, and Scott’s Axiom
and can avoid the problems that those axioms bring in their wake. This is
an interesting result by itself, since it establishes that comparativists can pre-
serve their favorite explanation of cardinality without necessarily committing
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to the stronger conditions required for probabilistic representability. More-
over, we have been able to show that the union of (pseudo)disjoint sets be-
haves like addition only if the comparative confidence ranking satisfies Preor-
der and R-Coherence. Inasmuch as comparativists want to retain the analogy
with the measurement and mass as it is usually understood (i.e., in terms of
the union of either disjoint or pseudodisjoint propositions), then Ramseyan
comparativism is as general as it gets.
It remains to be seen whether it is correct to say that an agent a considers
P to be n times more likely than Q iff P is as likely for her as the union of n
pseudodisjoint duplicates of Q. But we now know the minimal conditions
required for the analogy with mass to hold, so we can ask: (a) Are Preorder
and R-Coherence plausibly satisfied by actual agents—or at least, by the
kinds of agents who we are happy to say have degrees of belief that carry
cardinal information? And, (b) if so, does the GRP in those cases accurately
predict our considered judgments about the degrees of belief of such
agents? These are questions that I have not considered in this article, but
they will need careful consideration in future discussions on the viability
of the comparativist view.
Appendix
Proofs
Proof That, Given the Complete Package, Continuity Is Equivalent to
R-Scalability. Assume the Complete Package throughout. For the left to
right, assume Continuity. This entails that for every middling proposition
P, P ∼ (Q1 [ ::: [ Qn), where the Q1, ... , Qn belong to some m-scale of
Q, which gives us R-Scalability.
For the right to left, assume R-Scalability and (for reductio) that there
exists a nonminimal atom A in the algebra B such that for every other atom
A0, A0 ≿ A, with ‘≿’ replaced by ‘≻’ in at least one instance. (Equivalently:
assume there are nonminimal atoms not equally ranked by ≿.)
Since Q ∖ A is middling, it is R-scalable only if (Q ∖ A) ∼ (Q1 [ :::
[ Qn), for some Q1, ... , Qn in an m-scale of some R-scalable proposition
S such that S ≻ (Q ∖ A).11 However, let Cr be any probability function that
agrees with ≿; then
Cr(Q1) 1 ::: 1 Cr(Qn) 5 Cr(Q) 2 Cr(A):
11. We can safely ignore the case in which S ∼ (Q ∖ A), since then S will be R-scalable
only if Q ∖ A is.
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Furthermore, the Qi must be more probable than A, since as there exist at-
oms more probable than A the union of any and all propositions that are as
probable as A will be strictly less probable than Q ∖ A. So, Cr(Qi) > Cr(A),
and thus
Cr(Q1) 1 ::: 1 Cr(Qn) 1 ::: 1 Cr(Qm) > Cr(Q):
But there is no S ≻ Q, so Q ∖ A is not R-scalable, contradicting our assump-
tion. R-Scalability therefore implies that A ∼ A0 for any two nonminimal at-
oms A and A0; from this, Continuity straightforwardly follows. QED
Proof of Theorem 1. Part i: For the left to right, assume R-Coherence. If P
is n/m valued and n0/m0 valued, then n=m 5 n0=m0. So there exists a func-
tion Cr that assigns to each P ∈ N a unique rational value in [0, 1], and Cr
will be a Ramsey function relative to ≿ onN. This function can then be ex-
tended to the whole of B in the event that B 2 N ≠ ∅ in any way you like.
The right to left is obvious.
Part ii: For the left to right, assume R-Coherence and R-Scalability. For
any P, Q ∈ N (5B), suppose first that P ≿Q. Where P is n/m valued and Q
is n0/m0 valued, n=m ≥ n0=m0, so for any Ramsey function Cr relative to ≿,
Cr(P) ≥ Cr(Q). Next, suppose Cr(P) ≥ Cr(Q); since Cr is a Ramsey function,
P is n/m valued and Q is n0/m0 valued, for n=m ≥ n0=m0; by R-Coherence,
therefore P ≿Q. So from R-Coherence and R-Scalability, there is a Ramsey-
function Cr relative to ≿ that agrees with ≿. It is obvious from the definitions
that the restriction of Cr toN will always be the unique Ramsey function rel-
ative to ≿ on N, and in this case N 5 B.
For the right to left, the existence of the Ramsey-function Cr already en-
tails R-Coherence by part i. That its uniqueness condition also entails R-
Scalability is obvious given the finitude of B.
Proof of Theorem 2. The right to left of the existence part is obvious given
part i of theorem 1. For the left to right of the existence part, assume hence-
forth Preorder and R-Coherence. We focus on the case in whichN ⊂ B, as
R-Scalability trivializes the proof.
From Preorder, at least one nonempty set F 5 f fi : B ↦Rji 5 1, ::: ,
ng exists that agrees with ≿ (see Evren and Ok 2011, 556, proposition 1).
Suppose that F is maximal with respect to inclusion. We then just need
that there is some nonempty F * ⊆F such that F * also agrees with ≿ and
8 f ∈ F *, f has an order-preserving transformation f 0 that is a Ramsey
function with respect to ≿. (We will say that f 0 is an order-preserving trans-
formation of f just in case f (P) ≥ f (Q) iff f 0(P) ≥ f 0(Q).) The set of all such
transformations f 0 will then agree with ≿.
There are three cases to consider: (i)N is empty; (ii)N contains only the
minimal or maximal or both elements of B; (iii) N contains some middling
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propositions. The first two are straightforward and omitted. For the third,
note that if F agrees with ≿ and P ≻Q, then
1. f (P) ≥ f (Q) for all f ∈F .
2. f (P) > f (Q) for some, but not necessarily all, f ∈F .
For P, Q ∈ N , R-Coherence requires however that for any Ramsey func-
tion Cr, if P ≻Q, then Cr(P) > Cr(Q). Consequently, it is not true that if
F agrees with ≿, then every f ∈F has an order-preserving transformation
that is also a Ramsey function with respect to ≿. But define F * as follows:
F | 5 f ∈ Fj if  P,Q ∈ N  and P ≻Q,  then f (P) > f (Q)f g,
where F * will be nonempty and will agree with ≿. Let FN denote the set of
restrictions of every f ∈F | to N. Given this, the unique Ramsey function
(denoted CrN) on N is going to be an order-preserving transformation of
every f ∈ FN . So we just have to show that each f ∈F | has an order-
preserving transformation bounded by 0 and 1 that is an extension of CrN
from N to the whole of B. Since B is finite this is straightforward.
The proof of the uniqueness condition is obvious. If F and F 0 both agree
with ≿, then F [ F 0 will too. QED
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose just that Cr agrees with ≿ and that ≿ violates










There are three cases: (1) neither P nor Q is minimal, (2) both P and Q are
minimal, or (3) exactly one of P or Q is minimal.
Start with case 1. Focus on P, and let max designate some maximal prop-
osition. (If P is n/m valued and nonminimal, then max exists.) Here P is ei-
ther (i) as probable as the union of nmembers of anm-scale of max or (ii) as
probable as the union of n00 members of an m00-scale of . . . the union of n‴





If ii, it confirms only if
Cr(P) 5
(n00  :::  n‴)











Assume for reductio that Cr confirms the GRP, and suppose n=m ≥ n0=m0.
Hence, Cr(P) ≥ Cr(Q), and therefore P ≿Q. In the other direction, suppose









which violates our assumptions.
Now consider case 2. Assume for this case that there are P, Q ∈ B such
that P ≻Q and that if P is minimal, then Cr(P) 5 0. If P, Q are both min-
imal, then P ∼ Q, and if Cr agrees with ≿, then Cr(P) 5 Cr(Q) > Cr(R), for
any R such that R=∼P (and hence R ≻ P). Since P, Q are 0/m valued by def-
inition, R-Coherence is violated only if P or Q is also n/m valued, for n > 0.
Suppose this of P; then by the earlier reasoning, Cr confirms the GRP only if
Cr(P) 5 n=m  Cr(max). Since n=m > 0 and Cr(max) > 0, this is false, so
Cr disconfirms the GRP.
Case 3 is then straightforward, and the proof of the corollary (for sets of
functions) follows the same structure. Both proofs are omitted. QED
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